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In July 2015, China’s national legislature 
brought in prosecutor-led civil environmental public 
interest litigation (“EPIL”) for thirteen selected 
provincial areas of the country. After a two-year legal 
experiment, this prosecutor-led civil EPIL system was 
then established nationwide in July 2017. Yet, can it be 
said that prosecutorial regulators in China are in fact 
a paper tiger? Drawing upon content analysis of the 
655 prosecutor-led civil EPILs and in-depth interviews 
with twelve frontline prosecutors and judges, this 
article examines the dynamics of regulatory practice 
and the motivation of the Chinese prosecutorial organs 
to engage in environmental regulation through 
litigation. Based upon the above two legislative 
landmarks in the law reform of this area, the regulatory 
practice of prosecutorial organs can be viewed as 
having occurred in three stages, with each stage 
featuring a distinct regulatory model: ad hoc 
regulation through local innovation before July 2015, 
forced regulation during the legal experiment from July 
2015 to July 2017, and perfunctory regulation after the 
nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil 
EPIL system in July 2017. The data shows that the 
Chinese prosecutorial organs have engaged in a larger 
number of such lawsuits since the second stage, but 
they have shown a strong preference for cases with less 
complicated facts, weak and small defendants, and 
minor environmental violations. Three factors that 
influence regulatory motivation are employed to 
analyse the change in regulatory models: the ambiguity 
of the law, the top-down political pressure for 
regulation, and the cost of regulation. This study 
highlights the very limited effectiveness of vertical 
political pressure in boosting prosecutorial regulation 
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ambiguity of the law. In particular, the high cost of 
regulation that takes weak regulatory capacity, lack of 
regulatory autonomy, and the winning rate-oriented 
performance appraisal system into account have 
significantly weakened the motivation of prosecutorial 
organs to pursue civil EPIL. The findings of this study 
echo the conditions present in the successful 
prosecutorial regulations in Brazil and contribute to 
the scholarship about prosecutorial regulations in the 
field of environmental protection in the Global South. 
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Environmental law enforcement by China’s Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”) has been notoriously challenging.1 Faced 
with severe environmental violations and such weak enforcement by 
EPBs,2 China now needs new types of regulatory actors to step in to 
help enforce environmental law, and both non-governmental 
organizations and prosecutorial organs have taken on these roles in the 
Chinese environmental regulatory landscape. This article focuses on 
the prosecutorial regulators. The Chinese prosecutorial organs, called 
“the people’s procuratorate” (renmin jianchayuan 人民检察院), serve 
as prosecutors in criminal cases, representatives of the public interest 
and legal supervisors. 3  Despite the public interests involved in 
environmental litigation, in the past the role of the Chinese 
 
* Chunyan Ding, Associate Professor, School of Law, City University of 
Hong Kong.  
** Huina Xiao, Assistant Professor, Faulty of Law, Macau University of 
Science and Technology. Correspondence should be sent to hnxiao@must.edu.mo. 
1 Alex Wang, The Search for Sustainable Legitimacy: Environmental Law 
and Bureaucracy in China, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 367 (2013). 
2 E.g., Benjamin van Rooij & Carlos Wing-hung Lo, Fragile 
Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of China’s Industrial 
Pollution Law, 32 L. POL'Y 14, 15 (2010); Genia Kostka, Command Without 
Control: The Case of China’s Environmental Target System, 10 REG. 
GOVERNANCE 58, 58 (2016); Benjamin van Rooij, REGULATING LAND AND 
POLLUTION IN CHINA: LAWMAKING, COMPLIANCE, AND ENFORCEMENT: THEORY 
AND CASES 227-352 (2006); Benjamin Van Rooij, Rachel E. Stern & Kathinka 
Fürst, The Authoritarian Logic of Regulatory Pluralism: Understanding China’s 
New Environmental Actors, 10 REG. GOVERNANCE 3, 5 (2016). 
3 Mingde Cao & Fengyuan Wang, Environmental Public Interest 
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prosecutorial organs in environmental litigation was marginal and 
sporadic. However, on July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress (quanguo renda changweihui 全国人大
常委会 ), China’s national legislature, empowered the people’s 
procuratorates to file environmental public interest litigation (huanjing 
gongyi susong 环境公益诉讼, “EPIL”) against polluters in thirteen 
selected provincial areas. This regulatory innovation aimed to 
diversify the types of regulators and mechanisms there were to combat 
growing environmental violations.4 After a two-year experiment in 
legal reform with these prosecutor-led EPILs,5 the national legislature 
amended the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(“Civil Procedure Law”)6 on June 27, 2017 to establish the role of 
prosecutorial organs in filing EPIL and legalize prosecutorial public 
interest litigation nationwide. 
 
Before this legal reform, it was widely doubted in the literature 
whether Chinese prosecutorial organs could become a strong enough 
regulatory force to deter environmental violations. For instance, 
drawing on 24 prosecutorial civil litigation cases up to March 2013, 
and in-depth interviews with 16 prosecutors, Shi and van Rooij find 
that prosecutorial regulation in China is unlikely to develop into a new 
enforcement tool due to the lack of capacity and independence as well 
as the preference for criminal work.7 As Cao and Wang suggest, “[the] 
nature and content of environmental public interest litigation are 
inconsistent with the nature of the procuratorate and its power”.8 Liu 
also doubts whether prosecutorial organs have sufficient resources to 
devote to civil enforcement because they have been fully loaded with 
criminal prosecutions. 9  Given the dependence of Chinese 
 
4 Yifan Shi & Benjamin van Rooij, Prosecutorial Regulation in the Global 
South: Environmental Civil Litigation by Prosecutors in China compared to Brazil, 
10 REG. GOVERNANCE. 44, 44 (2016). 
5 Supreme People’s Procuratorate, PLAN FOR THE PILOT REFORM SCHEME 
OF INITIATING PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS BY THE PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES, 
(Promulgated on Jul. 2, 2015). See also Rooij, Stern, & Fürst, supra note 2. 
6 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (hereinafter CIVIL 
PROCEDURE LAW) (Promulgated on Apr. 9, 1991, Amended on Oct. 28, 2007, on 
Aug. 31, 2012 and on Jun. 27, 2017).  
7 Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4. 
8 Cao & Wang, supra note 3, at 222. 
9 Jingjing Liu, China’s Procuratorate in Environmental Civil 
Enforcement: Practice, Challenges & Implications for China’s Environmental 
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prosecutorial organs on local government at the same administrative 
level, some also argue that the procuratorate’s environmental civil 
enforcement actions may still be subject to local interference.10  A 
common concern is the legal ambiguity about the procuratorate’s 
standing and the procedural rules of EPIL.11 
 
Little literature has examined the performance of the Chinese 
prosecutorial organs in mobilizing EPIL and the factors that influence 
their performance since the national legislature approved prosecutor-
led EPIL in July 2015. Do prosecutorial regulators remain a “paper 
tiger” even now that they have been granted standing to sue 
environmental polluters? How have those factors that have influenced 
regulatory motivation changed over time? How can the Chinese 
experience contribute to the discourse on prosecutorial regulation in 
the Global South? This article aims to update and deepen the 
understanding of the practice of prosecutor-led EPIL and the 
regulatory motivation of the Chinese prosecutorial organs over three 
stages: local innovation before the legal reform of July 2015; 
experimental legal reform from July 2015 to July 2017; and 
nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil EPIL system after 
July 2017. Drawing on content analysis of 655 prosecutor-led civil 
EPILs up to December 2018, and in-depth interviews with 12 frontline 
prosecutors and judges from Beijing (north area of China), Shann’xi 
Province (northwest area of China), Fujian Province (southeast area of 
China), Guangdong Province (south area of China), Guangxi Zhuang 
Minority Autonomous Region (south area of China), and Guizhou 
Province (southwest area of China), as well as official statistical 
documents, this article finds that the Chinese prosecutorial organs’ 
practice and regulatory motivation to engage in civil EPIL has changed 
through three distinct regulatory models: from ad hoc regulation, 
through forced regulation, to perfunctory regulation. It also finds that 
although prosecutorial regulators have filed more and more 
environmental civil lawsuits against environmental polluters 
throughout the three stages, they have demonstrated a stronger 
preference for handling cases with less complicated facts, minor 
 
10 Christine J. Lee, "Pollute First, Control Later" No More: Combating 
Environmental Degradation in China Through an Approach Based in Public 
Interest Litigation and Public Participation, 17 PAC. RIM L. POL'Y J. ASS'N. 795, 
805–806 (2008); Liu, supra note 9. 
11 See, e.g., Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4, at 47; Cao & Wang, supra note 
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environmental pollution, weak and small defendants, and a small 
number of monetary claims. 
 
In this study, we employ three factors that may influence 
regulatory motivation to explain the change of the Chinese 
prosecutorial organs’ practice on civil EPILs from 2003 to 2018: 
ambiguity of the law (legal factor), top-down political pressure for 
regulation (political factor), and organizational cost of regulation 
(organizational factor). We find that the vertical political pressure has 
relatively limited effectiveness, and the organizational cost of 
regulation concerning capacity and autonomy for regulation as well as 
the winning rate-oriented performance appraisal system plays a critical 
role in shaping prosecutorial regulation in China, echoing the Brazilian 
experiences of prosecutorial regulation. The study further gains 
insights on the dynamics of the regulatory motivations that influence 
the regulatory performance of prosecutorial organs in the Global South. 
 
The article unfolds as follows. It first takes a brief look at 
China’s procuratorate system as well as its roles in environmental 
protection. The following part presents the empirical data collected on 
the prosecutor-led civil EPILs from 2003 to 2018 and the regulatory 
changes throughout the three stages noted above. It then analyzes how 
the underlying political, legal and organizational factors have changed 
and influenced the regulatory motivation, leading to the different 
models of prosecutorial regulations in the three stages. The final part 
concludes with the implications of this study and the suggestions for 
enhancing prosecutorial regulation in China. 
 
I. CHINA’S PROCURATORATE SYSTEM AND ITS ROLES IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
 
In China, the people’s procuratorates, as the State organs of 
legal supervision, exercise prosecutorial power to prosecute criminals 
and safeguard state security and social order, to protect the lawful 
rights and interests of individuals and organizations and the national 
interest and public interests, to guarantee the correct implementation 
of laws, to safeguard fairness and justice and protect the unity, dignity 
and authority of the legal system, as well as to ensure the smooth 
progress of construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics.12 
 
12 National People’s Congress, ORGANIC LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S 
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The procuratorate’s functions are therefore not confined to criminal 
investigations and prosecutions, and also include supervision over the 
police, prisons, and courts to ensure that their activities conform to the 
law. 13  In other words, the Chinese prosecutorial organs mainly 
undertake four types of work: criminal investigation and prosecution; 
supervision over criminal enforcement activities; supervision over 
civil and administrative litigations; and filing and participating in 
public interest litigations.14 
 
In practice, however, prosecutorial organs devote most of their 
efforts to criminal prosecutions.15 For instance, out of ten procuratorial 
offices (ting 厅) in the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (“SPP”), five 
offices deal with various criminal investigations and prosecutions,16 
three offices deal with legal supervision of criminal enforcement 
activities17 and civil and administrative litigations,18 one office deals 
with public interest litigations,19 and one office deals with complaints, 
state compensation and judicial assistance.20 It is noteworthy that at 
one point anti-corruption had been the most important work of the 
Chinese prosecutorial organs. However, its power of criminal 
investigation and prosecution has significantly decreased after the anti-
corruption office was removed from the organization and a new State 
organ called “the Supervision Committee” (jiancha weiyuanhui 监察
委员会) was established in 2018 to take over the prosecutorial organs’ 
 
LAW OF PROCURATORATES) (Promulgated on Jul. 5, 1979, Amended on Sept. 2, 
1983, on Dec. 2, 1986 and on Oct. 26, 2018), art. 2.  
13 Liu, supra note 9, at 47. 
14 ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES , art. 20, supra note 12. 
15 Liu, supra note 9, at 67. 
16 See SPP, Internal Institutions of the SPP,  
http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gjyjg/nsjg/index.shtml. Among these five offices that 
deals with criminal investigations and prosecutions, the First Office is in charge of 
the criminal prosecutions other than the prosecutions initiated by the Second, 
Third, and Fourth Offices; the Second Office deals with crimes of endangering 
national security, crimes of endangering public security, intentional homicide, 
robbery, drugs-related crime, etc.; the Third Office charges crimes of 
embezzlement and bribery, crimes of dereliction of duty, and crimes of 
servicemen’s transgression of duties; the Fourth Office is responsible for the 
prosecution of crimes of disrupting the order of the socialist market economy; and 
the Ninth Office deals with minor crimes prosecutions.  
17 Id. (The fifth Office). 
18 Id. (The sixth and seventh Offices).  
19 Id. (The eighth Office). 
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authority and functions regarding anti-corruption.21  Since then, the 
SPP has promoted “Four Major Procuratorships” (sida jiancha 四大
检 察 ) over criminal, civil, administrative and public interest 
litigations.22 This new development reveals a trend towards balancing 
the different types of prosecutorial work in China’s procuratorate 
system rather than keeping to its original focus on criminal work. 
 
As Article 138 of the Constitutional Law of the People’s 
Republic of China23 stipulates, “the Supreme People’s Procuratorate is 
responsible to the National People’s Congress and its Standing 
Committee. The people’s procuratorates at various levels are 
responsible to the organs of State power which created them, and to 
the people’s procuratorates at higher levels.” The Chinese 
prosecutorial organs are under the dual leadership: a vertical leadership 
of the superior procuratorates and a horizontal leadership of the local 
people’s congress (“LPC”) at the same level.24 The SPP is the national 
and highest prosecutorial organ and directs the work of the local 
people’s procuratorates at provincial, municipal and county levels as 
well as the work of the special people’s procuratorates (Figure 1). The 
veridical leadership of the superior procuratorates, however, is 
confined to prosecutorial work only. Specifically, the upper-level 
procuratorates can direct the lower-level procuratorates to correct, 
rescind or revise the latter’s decisions if they believe such decisions 
are wrong. They can also designate jurisdiction to the lower-level 
procuratorates or handle the cases which are under the jurisdiction of 
the lower-level procuratorates, and call up  on a centralized basis the 
prosecutors within their jurisdiction to handle cases.25 
 
21 The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, REFORM 
PLAN FOR STRENGTHENING THE PARTY AND NATIIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
(Promulgated on Mar. 21, 2018). 
22 To Provide Theoretical Support for the Comprehensive Development of 
the "Four Major Procuratorships" (Wei sidajiancha quanmian xietiao chongfen 
fazhan tigong lilun zhicheng), PROCURATORIAL DAILY (JIANCHA RIBAO) (Feb. 18, 
2019), http://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/201902/t20190218_408223.shtml. 
23 National People’s Congress, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Promulgated on Dec. 4, 1982, Amended on Apr. 12, 1988, on 
Mar. 29, 1993, on Mar. 15, 1999, on Mar. 14, 004, and on Mar. 11, 2018), art. 138. 
24 Zhanhong Hao, Analysis about the Working & Leading Relationship 
between Higher & Lower People’s Procuratorates (Shangxiaji renmin jianchayuan 
gongzuo lingdao guanxi xintan),  8 L. REV. (FAXUE ZAZHI) 114–117 (2009); Guiwu 
Wang, WANG GUIWU’S STUDY ON PROCURATORATE (WANG GUIWU LUN JIANCHA) 
46 (2008). 










In terms of the horizontal leadership, the LPC and its standing 
committee horizontally control the appointments and budgets of the 
procuratorate at the same level.26 For example, the chief procurators at 
various levels are elected and removed by the LPC at the same level, 
and the deputy chief procurators, members of prosecutorial 
committees and individual procurators are appointed and removed by 
the standing committee of the LPC at the same level.27  The LPC, 
however, is integrated with the local party committee of the 
Communist Party of China (“CPC”) and subject to the CPC.28 Indeed, 
“[i]n many jurisdictions, the chairman of the standing committee of the 
local people’s congress now concurrently serves as chairman or vice-
chairman of the party committee at the corresponding level”.29 The 
dependence of the local prosecutorial organs on the LPC and the local 
party committee is clear and significant.30 In 2015, in order to avoid 
local interference with prosecutorial work, local prosecutorial organs 
underwent an institutional reform aimed at bringing about the 
centralized management of personnel, financial and material resources 
of the procuratorates below the provincial level. 31  However, this 
reform only centralized the management of financial and material 
resources while personnel matters remain controlled by the LPC and 
the local party committee.32 
 
 
26 Hao, supra note 24. 
27 ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATORATES, art. 38, supra note 12.  
28 Keith J. Hand, Understanding China’s System for Addressing 
Legislative Conflicts: Capacity Challenges and the Search for Legislative 
Harmony, 26 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 139, 157 (2013). 
29 Id. at 208. 
30 Shi & van Rooij, supra note 4. 
31 Kai Xu, Focusing on the Institutional Reform on the Centralized 
Management of Personnel, Financial and Material Resources of Local Courts 
Below Provincial Level (Jujiao sheng yixia fayuan jianchayuan ren cai wu 
tongguan zhidu gaige), PROCURATORATE DAILY (JIANCHA RIBAO) (Jul. 27, 2015) 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/zdgz/201507/t20150727_102052.shtml. 
32 Liang Zhang, The Constitutional Perspective of Design and Reform of 
the Provincial Governing and Cross-Administrative-Division Court and 
Procuratorate System (Shengtongguan ji kua xingzheng quhua fayuan, jianchayuan 
shezhi gaige zhi xianfa shijiao), 23.1 J. CENT. SOUTH UNIV. SOC. SCI. (ZHONGNAN 
DAXUE XUEBAO(SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)) 41, 42 (2017); Qicai Gao, The Legal 
Obstacles in Unified Management of Staff Members and Properties of Courts and 
Procuratorates blow the Provincial Level (Shengyixia difang fayuan, jianchayuan 
rencaiwu tongyi guanli gaige de falü zhang'ai), 1 J. SUZHOU UNIV. (SUZHOU 
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 In the environmental protection arena, prosecutorial organs are 
responsible for investigating and prosecuting environmental crimes as 
well as supervising the work of EPBs and public security authorities 
with respect to environmental crimes.33 The SPP’s 2018 Work Report 
submitted to the National People’s Congress stated that prosecutorial 
organs cracked down on crimes related to damaging the environment 
and national resources and that they had prosecuted 137,000 persons 
in the last five years (amounting to an increase of 59.3 percent over 
five years) for air, water and land pollution, the importation of “foreign 
garbage”, the illegal occupation of cultivated land, illegal mining, 
illegal logging, and the like.34  
 
In addition, prosecutorial organs protect the environment through 
non-criminal approaches. First, prosecutorial organs have the power to 
protest (kangsu 抗诉), in accordance with the procedure of judicial 
supervision, illegal or incorrect rulings and judgments on civil and 
administrative environmental cases that are made by the lower-level 
courts 35  and request the same-level courts to conduct a retrial. 36 
Second, prosecutorial organs can advise relevant public organs in 
charge of the implementation of environmental law (in particular, the 
EPBs) in order to effectively implement laws and regulations and 
reduce environmental violations and crimes. 37  Third, prosecutorial 
organs can support private environmental litigations as well as EPILs 
 
33 Liu, supra note 9. 
34  Jianming Cao, Work Report of the Supreme People's Procuratorate at 
the First Meeting of the 13th National People's Congress (Zuigao renmin 
Jianchayuan gongzuo baogao, disanjie quanguo renmin daibaio dahui disanci 
huiyi)XINHUA NET (XINHUA WANG) (Mar. 9, 2018), 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/gzbg/201803/t20180325_372171.shtml. 
35 Authors’ Note (The people’s procuratorate, as the State’s legal 
supervisor, exercises a power to protest to the same-level court rulings and 
judgments on civil and administrative cases as well as criminal cases that are made 
by the lower-level courts and that it deems violating procedural and substantive 
justice.). See Fan Yu, The Functions of Judicial Supervision and the Design for Its 
System (Part One) (Sifa jiandu de gongneng ji zhidu sheji (shang)], 5 JUSTICE OF 
CHINA (ZHONGGUO SIFA) 22, 22 (2004). 
36 CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 208, supra note 6; Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE LAW) 
(Promulgated on Apr. 4, 1989, Amended on Nov. 1, 2014 and on Jun. 27, 2017), 
art. 93. 
37 SPP, PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE PROVISIONS ON PROCURATORIAL 
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filed by other state agencies or non-governmental organizations. 38 
Fourth, prosecutorial organs can supervise and put pressure on relevant 
supervising agencies and state-owned units to fulfil their supervisory 
responsibilities and bring civil litigations if they fail or are slow in 
doing so.39 Last but not least, prosecutorial organs have been recently 
granted authority to file civil and administrative EPILs. Out of all these 
non-criminal approaches that prosecutorial organs deploy in 
environmental protection, this article focuses on prosecutor-led civil 
EPILs. 
 




II. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE THREE STAGES OF PROSECUTOR-
LED CIVIL EPILS 
 
Before July 2015, only a few of the local prosecutorial organs 
were engaged in the legal innovation of suing polluters through civil 
litigation, which is categorized here as the first stage of prosecutor-led 
civil EPILs. The national legislature then launched a two-year 
 
38 CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, art. 55, supra note 6. 
39 Liu, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
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experimental legal reform of prosecutor-led EPIL in July 2015, which 
is categorized as the second stage. In July 2017, the prosecutor-led 
EPIL system was formally established and implemented nationwide, 
which is categorized as the third stage in this article.41 Because a civil 
case tried in the way of ordinary procedure 42  is required to be 
concluded within six months from the date of placing the case on file, 
according to Article 149 of the Civil Procedure Law, we divided the 
judicial decisions of prosecutor-led civil EPILs into three categories: 
(1) cases adjudicated before 2015 (inclusive) (i.e., cases filed before 
July 2015); (2) cases adjudicated in 2016 and 2017 (i.e., cases filed 
from July 2015 to July 2017); and (3) cases adjudicated after 2018 
(inclusive) (i.e., cases filed after July 2017). Each category was used 
to investigate the practice of prosecutorial organs in the corresponding 
stage. This part first presents an overview of the empirical data on 
judicial decisions of prosecutor-led civil EPILs across the country 
made between 2003 and 2018. A descriptive analysis of empirical data 
that demonstrates the changing practice of prosecutorial organs over 
the three stages of prosecutor-led civil EPILs will then follow. 
 
A. A Bird’s Eye View 
 
Our dataset contains 655 cases of prosecutor-led civil EPILs 
adjudicated from 2003 up to December 31, 2018. The cases 
adjudicated before 2014 were collected from the SPP’s official 
 
41 Authors’ Note (The experiment started on July 1, 2015 and ended on 
June 30, 2017. There were only two cases adjudicated before July 1, 2015. We thus 
counted these two cases of 2015 in the first stage. The prosecutor-led EPIL system 
was legislated in July 2017. The majority of cases adjudicated after July 2017, 
however, were initiated by the prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas before July 
2017. Therefore we counted the cases adjudicated in 2017 in the second stage. The 
third stage covers the cases that were filed after July 2017.). 
42 Id. (Civil lawsuits are in principle tried in the way of ordinary procedure 
(putong chengxu 普通程序) while simple lawsuits may be tried in the way of easy 
procedure (jianyi chengxu 简易程序). See CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW, Art. 157, supra 
note 6. Prosecutor-led civil EPILs (except those civil EPILs incidental to criminal 
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publications, 43  online resources44  and research articles, 45  while the 
cases adjudicated from 2014 to 2018 were collected from the Supreme 
People’s Court’s official online database called “China Adjudication 
Decisions Online”.46 In our dataset, there are only 31 prosecutor-led 
civil EPILs adjudicated before 2016, but the case number mushrooms 
from two cases in 2015, to 11 cases in 2016, 64 cases in 2017, and then 
to 549 cases in 2018 (Figure 2). Although, due to the delayed upload 
of adjudication decisions by the courts, the dataset only includes 53.77 
percent of the total number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs (1,021 cases) 
in 2018,47  nevertheless it is a robust sample to reveal the general 
characteristics of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in China. We coded a 
number of key variables, including the geographical location of the 
cases, the level of the court, the level of the trial, the date of the trial, 
 
43 Civil and Administrative Prosecutorial Office of the SPP (hereinafter 
CAPO), THE PRACTICE AND EXPLORATION OF PROSECUTORIAL ORGANS-INITIATED 
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS (JIANCHA JIGUAN TIQI GONGYI SUSONG SHIJIAN YU 
TANSUO) 33–45 (2017). 
44 See, e.g., PKU Law, pkulaw.cn; see also China Courts’ Website, 
chinacourt.org.  
45 Xudong Zhang  & Jingjie Lin, Expansion and Restriction: The Path for 
the Plaintiff Qualification Selection in China’s Environmental Civil Public Interest 
Litigation, 5 CHINA LEG. SCI. 133, 136 (2017); Zhi Bie & Tao Bie, Overview of the 
Development of Environmental Public Interest Litigations (Huanjing gongyi 
susong jinzhan gaishu), 412.1 B ENVTL. PROT. (HUANJING BAOHU] 23, 23–25 
(2009); Bojin Tao, On the Practice of the Prosecutorial organ Participating in 
Environmental Public Suits (Jiancha jiguan canyu huanjing minshi gongyi susong 
de shijian jinlu), 39.4 J. XINJIANG UNIV. (PHILOSOPHY, HUMANIT. SOC. SCI.) 
(XINJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN)) 34, 34–45, 
(2011). 
46 Authors’ Note (According to the Provisions of the SPC on Online 
Publication of Judgments by the People’s Courts (promulgated on Nov. 21, 2013), 
since January 1, 2014, all Chinese courts have been required to upload adjudication 
decisions to this online database except those cases involving state secrets, business 
secrets, privacy issues, and adolescent criminals. Therefore, China Adjudication 
Decision Online (zhongguo caipan wenshu wang 中国裁判文书网) has started 
releasing adjudication decisions from January 1, 2014.). See Global Legal Monitor, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-rules-
of-online-publication-of-court-judgments-revised/; see also Home page, CHINA 
JUDGEMENTS ONLINE, http://wenshu.court.gov.cn (Although Chinese courts are 
used to docket the same case involving multiple defendants as separate cases, we 
combine such cases into one case.). 
47 SPC, The News Conference for “Chinese Environmental and Resources 
Cases Trial 2017-2018”, “Report of the Chinese Environmental Judicial 
Development 2017-2018”, and Typical Cases of Ecological and Environmental 
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the name and location of the prosecutorial plaintiff, the type of 
prosecutor-led civil EPILs, the type of defendant, the type of 
environmental violation, the type and amount of claims, and the result 
of the cases. 
 






In terms of the type of adjudication decisions, out of 655 cases 
of prosecutor-led civil EPILs, 48 are verdicts dealing with procedural 
issues (7.33 percent), 592 are judgments dealing with substantive 
issues (90.38 percent), 14 are mediation decisions (2.14 percent) and 
one case (0.15 percent) is unknown. In terms of the level of the court, 
568 cases (86.72 percent) were tried by the district court, 79 cases by 
the appellate court (12.06 percent), and 8 cases by the high court (1.22 
percent). Out of all the cases, only 24 are appeal cases (3.66 percent). 
In terms of the type of prosecutor-led civil EPILs, 655 cases can be 
divided into two categories: 562 cases (85.8 percent) are “civil 
litigation incidental to criminal litigation” (xingshi fudai mingshi 
susong, 刑事附带民事诉讼 ,“incidental civil litigation”), through 
which civil claims against polluters are handled by the same collegial 
panel of environmental criminal litigation, and 93 cases (14.2 percent) 
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In terms of the geographical location of the cases, all provincial 
areas of the country have at least one prosecutor-led civil EPIL case 
except Hainan Province and the City of Tianjin (one of the four 
“municipalities directly under the Central Government”, zhixiashi, 直
辖市 ). Zhejiang Province has 66 cases, the highest among all 
provincial places, followed by Hunan Province (55 cases), Jiangsu 
Province and Sichuan Province (51 cases), Hubei Province (47 cases), 
Anhui Province (46 cases), Jiangxi Province (40 cases), Yunnan 
Province (38 cases), Guangdong Province (36 cases), and Jilin 
Province (34 cases) (Figure 3). However, the data do not reveal a clear 
relation between the geographical distribution of the cases and the 
economic development of the areas. The number of cases in rich, 
middle-income and poor areas is 164 (25.04 percent), 107 (16.34 
percent) and 384 (45.63 percent) respectively.48 
 
48 See China Statistical Yearbook 2018, NAT’L BUREAU OF STAT. OF 
CHINA, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm (For provincial per 
capita GDP rank.); see also Rich Province, Poor Province, THE ECONOMIST (Oct. 
1, 2016), https://www.economist.com/china/2016/10/01/rich-province-poor-
province (For the criteria of poor, middle-income, and poor areas. Rich provinces 
include Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, and Zhejiang. The 
middle-income provinces include Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, Shandong, Jilin, 
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Notes: Bold emphasises added for the top 10 provinces. 
Source: Author 
 
In terms of the type of prosecutorial plaintiff, 601 (91.76 
percent) are the prosecutorial organs at the district or county level and 
54 (8.24 percent) are the municipal-level prosecutorial organs. Out of 
633 cases with valid information, the defendants or environmental 
violators in 544 cases (85.93 percent) are individuals, those in 36 cases 
(5.69 percent) are companies, and those in 53 cases (8.37 percent) 
include both individuals and companies. 
 
Regarding the type of environmental violation, the majority of 
the cases (69.60 percent) involve ecological destruction (such as illegal 
mining, logging, fishing, and occupation of cultivated land). Cases of 
water pollution and those of soil pollution account for 16.34 percent 
and 8.81 percent respectively. Air pollution (2.84 percent) and noise 




Henan, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Sichuan, Gansu, 







2021]  A PAPER TIGER? PROSECUTORIAL REGULATIONS IN CHINA  339 
 
  
Figure 4. Types of Environmental Violations 
 
 
Notes: The number of types may exceed the number of cases because one case may 
have more than one type of environmental violation. 
Source: Author 
 
In terms of the type of claims, the data show that in 344 cases 
(52.52 percent) the prosecutorial plaintiffs claimed an injunction, in 84 
cases (12.82 percent) an apology, and in 477 cases (72.82 percent) a 
monetary remedy. The amount of monetary claims in prosecutor-led 
civil EPILs was relatively small. In the dataset, monetary claims in 
63.64 percent of 473 cases with valid information were less than RMB 
100,000; 27.06 percent of them ranged from RMB 100,000 to 1 million; 
and 9.31 percent of them exceeded RMB 1 million (Table 2). 
Regarding the court’s award, monetary claims in 80.13 percent of 473 
cases with valid information were fully supported, those in 8.25 
percent of the cases were supported more than half, those in 3.81 
percent of the cases were supported less than half, and only those in 
5.50 percent of the cases were totally rejected. In 2.33 percent of the 
cases courts provided other remedies (order or injunction) in lieu of 
damages (Table 2). Out of 340 cases that claimed an injunction, 281 
(82.65 percent) were upheld, 59 (17.35 per cent) were rejected, and 
courts in 15 cases (4.41 percent) awarded monetary compensation in 
lieu of an injunction. Except the cases disputing jurisdiction issues, 
courts awarded at least one type of remedy (injunction, apology and 
monetary remedy). In other words, the overall winning rate of the 
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B. The Changing Practice of Prosecutor-led Civil EPILs over 
the Three Stages 
 
This section provides a descriptive analysis of empirical data 
in each stage of prosecutorial regulation, which shows that the 
performance of the Chinese prosecutorial organs in engaging in civil 
EPILs has varied significantly in four aspects over the three stages. 
The first aspect is concerned with the type of prosecutor-led civil 
EPILs. Although the number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in the third 
stage increased by more than six times compared with the second stage, 
the percentage of ordinary civil litigations of EPIL slipped to 7.29 
percent, the lowest among the three stages, while the percentage of 
incidental civil litigations of EPIL rocketed to 92.71 percent, the 
highest in the three stages (Figure 5). This contrast shows that the 
prosecutorial organs are inclined to get clues to civil EPIL cases when 
they are investigating and prosecuting environmental criminal cases. 
Such an approach helps them to significantly reduce litigation costs in 
two major ways: first, the facts and evidence of environmental 
violations involved in criminal cases can be re-used for the purpose of 
pursuing civil EPILs; and second, civil proceedings of an incidental 
civil litigation can be simplified and merged into criminal proceedings, 
which is within the “comfort zone” of prosecutors. In contrast, in 
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time and effort to investigate the case facts and collect evidence, and 
then participate in longer and more complicated civil proceedings. 
 






The second aspect is concerned with the type of defendant in 
prosecutor-led civil EPILs. The data show that prosecutorial organs 
are more willing to choose individual defendants over corporate ones. 
The percentage of cases involving individual defendants increased 
from 61.29 percent in the first stage, to 66.67 percent in the second 
stage, and then to 91.20 percent in the third stage, increasing by 29.91 
percent overall (Figure 6). However, the percentage of cases involving 
corporate defendants dropped from 38.71 percent in the first stage, to 
33.33 percent in the second stage, and then further to 8.8 percent in the 
third stage (Figure 6). Therefore, the prosecutorial organs are clearly 
inclined to sue weak and small defendants in civil EPILs, and 
moreover they demonstrated a growing inclination to do this 
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The third aspect of the changing practice of prosecutor-led civil 
EPILs concerns the type of environmental pollution involved in the 
cases. As mentioned above, ecological destruction cases are the most 
common type of environmental violation that gives rise to prosecutor-
led civil EPILs. The data show that there were eight ecological 
destruction cases in the first stage. The number increased to 41 in the 
second stage and then rocketed to 441 in the third stage (Figure 7). The 
percentage of ecological destruction cases increased greatly from 
21.62 percent in the first stage, to 53.25 percent in the second stage, 
and then further to 76.70 percent in the third stage. In contrast, the 
percentage of water, air and noise pollution cases significantly 
declined. The exception was soil pollution cases, whose percentage at 
first increased from 8.11 percent in the first stage to 16.88 percent in 
the second stage, but later dropped back to 8 percent in the third stage 
(Figure 8). Compared with other types of environmental violation, 
ecological destruction cases are much easier and cheaper for 
prosecutorial organs to handle in terms of case selection, fact-finding 
and evidence collection. Moreover, many of the ecological destruction 
cases were initiated in the manner of civil litigation incidental to 
criminal prosecution for ecological destruction, as analysed above, 
which saved substantially litigation costs on the part of prosecutorial 
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stronger preference for ecological destruction cases in pursuing civil 
EPILs throughout all the three stages. 
 
Figure 7. Changes in the Number of Different Environmental Violations 






Figure 8. Changes in the Percentage of Different Environmental Violations 
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The fourth aspect of the changing practice of prosecutor-led 
civil EPILs concerns the amounts of monetary claims involved in civil 
EPILs. The data reveal that the overall amounts of monetary claims 
involved in prosecutor-led civil EPILs shrank over the three stages. 
Although the absolute value of the case number in each range of claim 
amounts grew (Figure 9), the percentage of cases with a smaller 
amount of monetary claims (less than RMB 10,000 and between RMB 
10,001 and RMB 100,000) significantly increased, while the 
percentage of cases with a larger amount of monetary claims (more 
than RMB 100,000) decreased (Figure 10). A temporary small increase 
in the percentage of cases with the amount of monetary claim between 
RMB 500,000 and RMB 1,000,000 and over RMB 10 million in the 
second stage did not change the overall trend in this regard. 
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Figure 10. Changes in the Percentage of Different Categories of Monetary 






To sum up, it is possible to descriptively characterize the trend 
of prosecutor-led civil EPILs against environmental polluters over the 
three stages as follows: although the case number is increasing, 
prosecutorial organs tend to choose less complicated cases involving 
minor environment pollution against individual but not corporate 
defendants, and seek monetary claims of a smaller amount. In 
particular, in the first stage (before July 2015), despite a small number 
of cases, prosecutorial organs preferred high-profile cases with more 
complicated facts, corporate defendants, serious environmental 
pollution and larger monetary claims. However, from the second stage 
(from July 2015 to July 2017) on, despite a growing number of 
prosecutor-led civil EPILs, prosecutorial organs have been more 
willing to choose less complicated cases with lower monetary claims 
against individual defendants and minor environmental pollution. Why 
have prosecutorial organs changed their preference in terms of case 
selection when pursuing civil EPILs? How has their regulatory 
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III. EXPLAINING REGULATORY MOTIVATIONS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
ORGANS 
 
Regulators are motivated by various factors. To study the 
regulatory motivation of prosecutorial organs, three categories of 
factors are employed: legal, political and organizational. The legal 
factor concerns whether the law has provided legal enforcers (e.g., 
courts, procuratorates, and the police) with a legal basis and procedural 
rules for regulation. The political factor concerns the top-down 
political pressure to implement national policies and strengthen 
regulation. The organizational factor refers to the calculations of the 
cost of regulation, which is concerned with regulatory capacity and 
autonomy as well as the performance appraisal mechanism applied to 
regulators.  
 
In terms of the first factor, the presence of legal standing and 
procedural rules for regulation is critical for regulators to legalize and 
guide their regulatory acts. The law also establishes the accountability 
of regulators (including who is accountable, whom to account to, and 
what to account for).49 The certainty of law reduces the legal risk of 
regulation. The ambiguity of law may restrict the scope of law 
application and make “organizations often simply copy what other 
organizations are doing”.50  However, legal ambiguity may provide 
“opportunities for circumventing or enabling implementation at the 
local level”.51 Nolette, for example, suggests that the ambiguity of the 
law grants prosecutors the opportunity to bring government-led 
litigations and mobilize the law.52 
 
In relation to the second factor, the party-state relies on the 
cadre responsibility system to implement its policies or achieve its 
 
49 Colin Scott, Accountability in the Regulatory State, 27 J. L. SOC'Y. 38, 
41 (2000). 
50 Ryken Grattet & Valerie Jenness, The Reconstitution of Law in Local 
Settings: Agency Discretion, Ambiguity, and a Surplus of Law in the Policing of 
Hate Crime, 39 L. SOC'Y. REV. 893, 901 (2005). 
51 Id. at 895; see also Kitty Calavita, Immigration, Law, and 
Marginalization in a Global Economy: Notes from Spain, 32 L. SOC'Y. REV. 529, 
546 (1998); Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: 
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1536-1538 
(1992). 
52 Paul Nolette, Law Enforcement as Legal Mobilization: Reforming the 
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targets, such as environmental policy, 53  campaign enforcement, 54 
maximization of tax revenues,55  population control,56  and the like. 
Under the leadership of the party, government and legal institutions 
(including courts and procuratorates) at all levels should conform to 
the party’s political goals. Local party committees and upper-level 
offices supervise the lower-level agencies to implement policies or 
innovations through performance appraisal or evaluation, rewards (e.g., 
promotion, and monetary or symbolic rewards) as well as sanctions 
(e.g., demotion, transfer-position, criticism and party discipline). 57  
 
As for the last factor, law enforcers are by nature risk averse.58 
Law enforcers calculate the expected organizational costs and benefits 
before taking regulatory action. The existing literature often takes any 
cost associated with risk aversion into consideration.59 In this study, 
however, we focus on the following aspects, which are concerned with 
the cost of regulation: the risk of losing cases, insufficient regulatory 
capacity and the risk of offending local government (i.e., the lack of 
regulatory autonomy), with the first two of these interacting with each 
other. In the setting of prosecutorial regulation, negative litigation 
outcome will significantly influence performance appraisal of the 
Chinese prosecutorial organs, which impacts the personnel, financial 
 
53 See, e.g., Wang, supra note 1; Kostka, supra note 2. 
54 See, e.g., Benjamin van Rooij, China’s War on Graft: Politico-Legal 
Campaigns Against Corruption in China and Their Similarities to the Legal 
Reactions to Crisis in the U.S., 14 PAC. RIM L. POL'Y J. 298, 298-336 (2005); Susan 
Trevaskes, POLICING SERIOUS CRIME IN CHINA: FROM “STRIKE HARD” TO “KILL 
FEWER” 24-41 (2010). 
55 Jean C. Oi, Fiscal Reform and the Economic Foundations of Local State 
Corporatism in China, 45 WORLD POL. 99, 126 (1992); Ji Li, A Chinese Model for 
Tax Reforms in Developing Countries?,THE BEIJING CONSENSUS? HOW CHINA HAS 
CHANGED WESTERN IDEAS OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 176, 176–202 
(Weitseng Chen ed., 2015); Huina Xiao, Why Law Enforcement Is Weak in China: 
The Mindset of the Frontline Tax Officials, 31 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 218, 226-227 
(2018). 
56 Kevin O’Brien & Lianjiang Li, Selective Policy Implementation in 
Rural China, 31 COMP. POL. 167, 172 (1999). 
57 See Yongshun Cai, STATE AND AGENTS IN CHINA: DISCIPLINING 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 63 (2017) (Party discipline includes five categories: 
warned, seriously warned, removed from the position in the Party, on probation 
with the Party, and expelled from the party.). 
58 Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, 
and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1974). 
59 Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Public Enforcement 
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and material resources that the procuratorates can obtain, thus 
influencing their regulatory capacity. In addition, to implement 
policies and the law, prosecutorial organs must have adequate abilities 
concerning personnel and budget resources, knowledge, information, 
experience, administrative support, and the like. Insufficient capacity 
leads to a high risk of losing cases and a high cost of legal 
enforcement.60 Finally, a lack of regulatory autonomy, in other words, 
“regulators’ susceptibility to external influence”, causes interferences 
from local government agencies and party committees. 61  In 
developing countries, regulatory organs tend to have weaknesses in 
relation to autonomy and capacity, which leads to poor enforcement 
outcomes.62 In this study, given that the negative litigation outcome 
greatly matters for prosecutorial organs in terms of performance 
appraisal, and their regulatory capacity and autonomy remain weak, 
the costs of regulation through civil EPILs become a big concern for 
them . 
 
IV. CHANGES IN REGULATORY MOTIVATION OF PROSECUTORIAL 
ORGANS OVER THE THREE STAGES 
 
The empirical data presented in part three of this article 
demonstrate the changing practices of the Chinese prosecutorial 
organs in engaging in civil EPILs over the three stages. Indeed, the 
different practice of prosecutor-led civil EPILs in each stage shows 
three different regulatory models, which have been labelled as follows: 
“ad hoc regulation” through local innovation before July 2015; “forced 
regulation” during the legal experiment from July 2015 to July 2017; 
and “perfunctory regulation” after the nationwide establishment of the 
prosecutor-led civil EPIL system in July 2017. This part further 
investigates the dynamics of the underlying regulatory motivation of 
prosecutorial organs that can help us to understand the changes in their 
regulatory practices. As explained in part three, three factors (legal, 
 
60 Benjamin van Rooij, Greening Industry Without Enforcement? An 
Assessment of the World Bank’s Pollution Regulation Model for Developing 
Countries, 32 L. POL'Y 127, 138 (2010); see alsovan Rooij & Lo, supra note 2.  
61 Lesley K. Mcallister et al., Reorienting Regulation: Pollution 
Enforcement in Industrializing Countries, 32 L. POL'Y 1, 5 (2009). 
62 Lesley K. McAllister, Dimensions of Enforcement Style: Factoring in 
Regulatory Autonomy and Capacity, 32 L. POL'Y 61, 61-78 (2010); Benjamin Van 
Rooij & Lesley McAllister, Environmental Challenges in Middle-Countries:A 
Comparison of Enforcement in Brazil, Mexico, and Indonesia, LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES: AVOIDING THE MIDDLE-INCOME 
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political and organizational) that influence regulatory motivation were 
adopted: the ambiguity or certainty of the law, the top-down political 
pressure, and the cost of regulation (which is concerned with weak 
capacity for regulation, lack of autonomy for regulation, and 
performance appraisal of prosecutorial organs). These factors are 
analyzed in detail for each of the three regulatory models of 
prosecutorial organs. 
 
A. “Ad Hoc Regulation”: Local Innovation before July 2015 
 
In the first stage (i.e., before July 2015), the law was 
ambiguous about the standing of prosecutorial organs to file civil 
EPILs, but this legal ambiguity at the same time provided an 
opportunity for legal innovation. In the dataset, a total of 31 civil EPIL 
cases were filed in ten provincial areas (Figure 2): Guangdong 
Province (7 cases), Shandong Province (6 cases), Zhejiang Province 
(5 cases), Jiangxi Province (3 cases), Jiangsu Province (3 cases), 
Sichuan Province (2 cases), Guizhou Province (2 case), Hunan 
Province (1 case), Fujian Province (1 case) and, the city of Chongqing 
(which is a municipality directly under the Central Government) (1 
case). As analysed below, the number of civil EPILs was small due to 
the legal ambiguity over the issue of procuratorate standing, the weak 
political pressure for regulation and the high cost of regulation. Only 
when there was a strong political need and a high degree of certainty 
about winning the case would the local prosecutorial organs dare to 
file an action. Therefore, the prosecutorial organ’s practice at the first 
stage was termed “ad hoc regulation”, that is, prosecutorial regulation 
happened sporadically in response to particular local needs. 
 
1. Ambiguity of the Law regarding Standing 
 
China’s first Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorate that 
was passed in 1954 granted prosecutorial organs the power to file or 
participate in litigation in relation to significant civil cases that involve 
the interests of the state and society. 63 Furthermore, the 1979 Civil 
Procedure Law (Draft) had provisions regarding prosecutorial organs’ 
participation in civil lawsuits.64 However, when the Civil Procedure 
 
63 ORGANIC LAW OF PROCURATOERATES, art. 4, supra note 12. 
64  Hui Zhao, Research and Analysis of Civil Procuratorial System (minshi 
jiancha zhidu yanxi), 47.6 J. INNER MONGOLIA NORM UNIV. (PHILOSOPHY, SOC. 
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Law was finally promulgated in 1982, the draft provisions were not 
included because some believed that prosecutorial organs should only 
concentrate on criminal work.65 
 
Before July 2015, the national legislature, the SPP and the 
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) generally disapproved of prosecutor-
led public interest litigation. Article 15 of the Civil Procedure Law that 
was amended in 1991 provides that “where an act has infringed upon 
the civil rights and interests of the State, a collective organization or 
an individual, any state organ, public organization, enterprise or 
institution may support the injured unit or individual to bring an action 
in a people’s court”. The law only entitled prosecutorial organs, as 
State organs, to “support” but not “participate in” civil litigations. 
Moreover, in 2004, the SPC replied to a local court which asked for 
instructions about the case of En’shi Autonomous Prefecture 
Procuratorate v. Zhang Suwen (regarding returning state property) 
that a prosecutor-led civil litigation in the name of the State for the 
purpose of protecting state property and public interest should not be 
accepted by the people’s courts because of an absence of legal 
authority.66 Subsequently, the SPP also issued a notice announcing 
that the people’s procuratorates could not bring any civil or 
administrative litigation without the approval of the SPP.67 After that, 
local prosecutorial organs stopped initiating such litigations. 
 
However, with the establishment of a special environmental 
division within local courts, local legislators and the local judiciary (in 
particular, in Guizhou Province, Jiangsu Province and Yunnan 
Province) issued local regulations to grant prosecutorial organs 
standing to sue in civil EPIL. For instance, in 2007, the Intermediate 
People’s Court of Guiyang City clarified in its judicial interpretation 
that the people’s procuratorates were entitled to file EPIL.68 In 2009, 
the People’s Congress of Guiyang City passed a local regulation 
(difangxing fagui 地方性法规) titled “the Regulations on Promoting 
 
65
Id. Liu, supra note 9, at 55 n.50. 
66 SPC, REPLIY ON THE ENSHI CITY PEOPEL'S PROCURATORATE V. ZHANG 
SUWEN FOR RETURNING STATE PROPERTY CASE (Promulgated on Jun. 17, 2004). 
67 Zixin Zhang, The Standing of the People’s Procuratorate to File Public 
Interest Litigations and Special Features (renmin jianchayuan tiqi gongyi susong 
de diwei ji qi teshuxing), 11 CHINESE PROCURATORS (ZHONGGUO JIANCHAGUAN) 
59, 60 (2019). 
68 Alex Wang & Gao Jie, Environmental Courts and the Development of 
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the Construction of an Ecological Civilization”,69 which was the first 
local regulation to empower the people’s procuratorate to lodge civil 
EPIL. 70  Moreover, in 2008, the Intermediate People’s Court, the 
People’s Procuratorate and the Legal Affairs Office of the People’s 
Government in Wuxi City of Jiangsu Province jointly promulgated the 
Interim Regulations on the Handling of Civil EPIL Cases,71 which was 
the first set of local administrative rules (difangxing xingzheng 
guizhang 地 方 性 行 政 规 章 ) emphasizing that the people’s 
procuratorate should take the lead in engaging in civil EPIL.72 
 
Despite the absence of a national legal authority, with a green 
light from the local authority, local prosecutorial organs undertook the 
legal innovation of civil EPIL. For example, in the case of the 
Municipal People’s Procuratorate of Guiyang City v Xiong Jinzhi, Lei 
Zhang and Chen Tingyu (2008), the Municipal People’s Procuratorate 
of Guiyang City sued three violators of environmental law, requesting 
them to stop damaging Turtle Hill in Aha Lake and restore the 
vegetation they had destroyed in this area. Its standing to sue was 
upheld by the Intermediate People’s Court of Guiyang City.73 Where 
there lacked local regulation or judicial interpretation to support the 
procuratorate’s legal standing, in order to justify the prosecutorial 
organ’s standing in civil EPIL some local judges developed an 
innovative but controversial expanded interpretation and application 
of Article 6 of the Environmental Protection Law of the People’s 
Republic of China,74 which stipulates that all units and individuals 
have the obligation to protect the environment.75 
 
69 Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of Guiyang, GUIYANG 
MUNICIPAL REGULATIONS ON PROMOTING THE CONSTRUCTION OF AN ECOLOGICAL 
CIVILIZATION (Passed on Oct.16, 2009), 43.6 CHINESE L. & GOV’T 43, 43-52 
(2010). 
70 Dan Li, The Local Practices of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigations and Its Institutional Implications (Woguo huanjing gongyi susong de 
difang shijian jiqi zhidu qishi), 4 WESTERN L. REV. (XIBU FALV PINGLUN] 21, 22 
(2011). 
71 Jie Gao, The Vitality of EPIL and Environmental Court (Huanjing 
gongyi susong he huanbao fating de shengmingli), PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY 
(RENMIN FAYUAN BAO) (Jan. 29, 2010), 
http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleFullText.aspx?ArticleId=93268. 
72 Id. 
73 Cao & Wang, supra note 3.  
74 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Promulgated on Dec. 26, 1989, Amended on Apr. 24, 2014). 
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In August 2012, the Civil Procedure Law was amended to add 
a new provision, Article 55, that allows State organs prescribed by law 
or relevant organizations to bring a lawsuit for environmental pollution 
that damages public interests. However, the provision does not clarify 
which State organs and relevant organizations have standing to sue in 
civil EPIL. The ambiguity of the national law regarding the plaintiff’s 
qualification almost turned the green light of the local authority to red 
and largely discouraged prosecutorial organs from filing civil EPIL at 
courts thereafter (Figure 2). In January 2015, the SPC reiterated that 
prosecutorial organs should only support social organizations to bring 
civil EPILs according to Article 15 of the Civil Procedure Law.76 At 
that point, Chinese law had still not clarified the standing of 
prosecutorial organs to file civil actions in the public interest. 
 
2. Weak Political Pressure for Regulation 
 
In the first stage, the political pressure for regulation emerged 
with the local governments’ concern about social instability resulting 
from deteriorating environmental pollution. 77  When serious 
environmental violations gave rise to public outcries, local 
governments had to respond and take action to punish the polluters. 
For instance, in the case of the Municipal Procuratorate of Yueling 
City of Shandong Province v Fan Jinhe Case (2003), the citizens in 
Yueling City complained about the severe air pollution caused by 
Fan’s factory. As a result, the local government promised a sanction 
as a quid pro quo for the citizens’ claim to stop the pollution.78 In 
another case, the Basic Procuratorate of Bishan County of Chonqing 
City v Chongqing Ou’Yong Livestock Cultivation Cooperative (2010), 
poultry waste had fouled the Binan River and destroyed the habitats of 
species. The local government, the local party committee and the local 
prosecutorial organ were determined to resolve the problem. After 
seeking approval from the upper-level prosecutorial organ, the district-
 
76 SPP, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SPP ON SEVERAL LEGAL APPLICATION 
ISSUES OF TRIALING ENVIRONMENTAL CIVIL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS 
(Promulgated on Jan. 6, 2015, Amended on Dec. 29, 2021), art. 15. 
77 Wang, supra note 1. 
78 Wusheng Zhang, The Procuratorate of Yueling City of Shandong 
Province v. Fan Jinhe for Environmental Pollution Damages (Shandongsheng 
yuelingshi renmin jianchayuan su Fan Jinhe huanjing wuran sunhai peichang), 
CHINA MASS LITIGATIONS: THEROIES AND ANALYSIS OF CASES (ZHONGGUO QUNTI 
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level procuratorate filed an action against the polluter.79 Although they 
received ad hoc requests from the local government or party 
committee, prosecutorial organs at this stage faced little political 
pressure to lodge civil EPILs. 
 
3. High Cost of Regulation 
 
Despite an opportunity for legal innovation due to the 
ambiguity of the law, prosecutorial organs had to calculate the costs of 
filing civil EPILs. The most prominent cost related to the risk of losing 
the case, which could significantly influence their ranking among all 
local procuratorates in the annual performance appraisal conducted by 
their upper-level procuratorate. The performance appraisal mechanism 
was initially established to enhance prosecutorial work and 
management. 80  According to Yu, who conducted interviews in a 
district-level procuratorate, the performance appraisal mechanism 
comprised two parts: “quantity” (shu 数) and “rate” (lü 率). The 
quantity evaluation concerned the number of criminal cases initiated, 
the number of prosecutions of escaped criminals, and the number of 
protests of judicial decisions on criminal cases. The rate evaluation, 
which was more important, concerned the rate of cases closed, the 
quality of cases initiated, the rate of change of protested judicial 
decisions on criminal cases and the success rate of protests of judicial 
decisions on criminal cases. Among all these elements, the quality of 
cases initiated, which referred to the rate of acquittal and the rate of 
withdrawal, was the most important because it accounted for 40 
percent of performance appraisal scores (Figure 11). 81  As Yu has 
suggested, “if an acquittal is issued by the court or the prosecutorial 
organ withdraws a case because of insufficient evidence, it will have a 
veto effect on annual performance appraisals and all staff from the 
 
79 The Procuratorate of Bishan County of Chongqing Initiates Public 
Interest for the Pollution Victims (Chongqing bishanxian jianchayuan ti wuran 
shouhaizhe tiqi gongyi susong), PROCURATORATE DAILY (JIANCHA RIBAO) (Aug. 5, 
2010), http://news.sina.com.cn/green/news/roll/2010-08-05/100520831780.shtml. 
80 Zexuan Xiang, Examination on the Performance Appraisal Mechanism 
of Procuratorial Work (Jiancha yewu kaoping jizhi tanxi), 18.4 J. NATL. PROSEC. 
COLL. (GUOJIA JIANCHAGUAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO) 64, 67 (2010). 
81 Deshui Yu, A Survey Report about Performance Appraisal System in 
Prosecutorial organs (Guanyu jiancha jiguan jixiao kaohe zhidu de diaocha 
baogao), 2 CRIM. SCI. (ZHONGGUO XINGSHI FA ZAZHI) 114, 116–117 (2015); 
Jinliang Jiang & Houliang Jiang, The Influence of Performance Appraisal on the 
Dysfunction of Criminal Procedure (Jixiao kaoping dui xingshi chengxu shiling de 
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chief prosecutor down to basic-level personnel are required to jointly 
bear the responsibility. This is a fatal blow to a prosecutorial organ.”82 
In addition, prosecutorial organs would be either punished or rewarded 
based on their ranking among all local procuratorates in terms of 
annual performance appraisal. For example, the procuratorates at the 
district level that ranked in the bottom three had to submit a report to 
identify problems and make improvement plans, 83  while the 
prosecutors working in those ranked in the top three over three 
consecutive years might have an opportunity to gain promotion, obtain 
a role model reward, or receive monetary benefits.84 
 





The same criteria of performance appraisal applied to 
prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs. Under the pressure of the 
performance appraisal and inter-organizational competition, local 
prosecutorial organs were often reluctant to initiate civil EPILs 
 
82 Yu, supra note 81, at 117. 
83 Id. at 118, n. 4. 
84 Id. at 119. 
85 Id. at 117. 
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because they lacked the capacity and confidence to win cases. A 
prosecutor from a northwest province told us in our interview: 
 
There are risks of lodging ordinary civil litigations. First, it is 
difficult for prosecutorial organs to engage in civil litigations, 
as it requires stronger capacity than that required in criminal 
cases. Some large companies have stronger litigation capacity 
and are more professional than we are. Second, it brings great 
pressure to the prosecutorial organs if they lose the lawsuits, 
especially in the circumstances where more than 95 percent of 
criminal cases end with successful conviction in court. Despite 
few political risks, we procuratorates are subject to much 
pressure of performance appraisal. Our annual performance 
appraisal may rank the bottom if we lose a single case … The 
prosecutors who lose the case are also subject to pressure 
within the organization. That would be very tough for us. 
 
Although filing environmental civil EPILs can help a prosecutorial 
organ achieve innovation rewards,86 this only happens if it succeeds at 
court. Another prosecutor from Guangdong province, who filed six 
civil EPIL cases between 2003 and 2014, admitted that prosecutorial 
organs at municipal or district level sought approvals and instructions 
from the upper-level prosecutorial organs as well as the local courts. 
This echoes the previous observations regarding the prosecutorial 
practice of handling criminal litigation called “pipelining processing” 
(liushuixian zuoye 流水线作业) or “reversed criminal procedure” 
(xingshi chengxu daoliu 刑事程序倒流 ). It refers to the internal 
cooperation and communication among the police, prosecutorial 
organs and courts before prosecutors bring criminal cases to the court 
in order to ensure conviction.87 Therefore, the risk of losing cases is an 
 
86 Shi& van Rooij, supra note 4. 
87 See, e.g., Ruihua Chen, From “Pipelining Processing” towards 
“Focusing on Adjudication”: A Thought on Chinese Criminal Judicial Reform 
(Cong “liushui zuoye” zouxiang “yi caipan wei zhongxin”: dui zhongguo xingshi 
sifa gaige de yizhong sikao), 3 L. SCI. (FAXUE) 24, 26 (2000); Guoli Yu & Tao Jin, 
On the Relationship of Judicial Justice and Section Game: Focusing on 
thePerformance Appraisal of Prosecutorial OrgansSystem (Bumen boyi yu sifa 
gongzheng: yi jiancha jiguan jixiao kaohe wei zhongxin), 12.3 J. SOUTHWEST 
UNIV. POLIT. SCI. L. (XINAN ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO) 63, 67 (2010); Xiao Cai, 
On the Reverse Procedure in Prosecution: Research of Three Procuratorates in the 
Z Area of Guangdong Province (Gongsu huanjie chengxu daoliu wenti yanjiu: yi 
guangdongsheng Z diqu san jianchayuan wei kaocha duixiang), 117 J. FUJIAN 
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organizational cost for prosecutorial organs to engage in civil EPILs. 
As long as the winning rate-oriented performance appraisal 
mechanism remains unchanged, the motivation of prosecutorial organs 
to file civil EPILs will be restricted. 
 
The other cost of engaging in civil EPILs concerned regulatory 
capacity and autonomy. The weak capacity of prosecutorial organs 
with respect to the shortage of knowledge and experience regarding 
ordinary civil litigation, case information, funding and human 
resources also contributed to their reluctance to file civil EPILs. In 
terms of human resources, many prosecutorial organs at municipal and 
district levels were only equipped with three to four prosecutors in 
charge of legal supervision of civil and administrative cases, with their 
work including the handling of EPILs. According to an interview at 
the People’s Procuratorate of Laoshan District of Qingdao City of 
Shandong Province,88 out of all the offices in this organization, only 
three staff were designated to the Office of Legal Supervision of Civil 
and Administrative Cases, and they had to handle 20 civil and 
administrative cases in the first half of 2009. In terms of financial 
resources, prosecutorial organs did not charge the parties a fee to 
protest judicial decisions on civil cases. With limited budgets, they 
lacked funding to file civil EPILs, which required them to hire and pay 
experts to provide expert opinions to support their claims. 89  If 
prosecutorial organs lost the case, they would have to bear high 
litigation costs.90 
 
Moreover, as noted in part one of this article, the dependence 
of prosecutorial organs on the local government and party committee 
also demotivated them to file civil EPILs against local corporates, in 
particular, large and listed companies. When those big corporate 
taxpayers were sued by prosecutorial organs in civil EPILs, the local 
government would intervene because it was afraid that such litigations 
could scare its large-sized corporate taxpayers away.91 Therefore, the 
 
88 Hong Mei & Lu Wang, The Theory, History, and Suggestions on Legal 
Safeguards of Prosecutor-led Environmental Public Interest Litigations (Jiancha 
jiguan tiqi huanjing gongyi susong de fali, lishi, jiqi falü baozhang jianyi), 1 CHINA 
ENVTL. L. SYSTEM (ZHONGGUO HUANJING FAZHI) 45, 50 (2012). 
89 Hui Liu & Xin Jiang, Empirical Research on the Pilot of Civil Public 
Interest Litigation Proposed by the Procuratorate (Jiancha jiguan tiqi minshi 
gongyi susong shidian qingkuang shizheng yanjiu), 25.2 J. NATL. PROSEC. COLL. 
(GUOJIA JIANCHAGUAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO) 59, 71 (2017).  
90 Mei & Wang, supra note 88, at 50–51. 
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weak regulatory autonomy of prosecutorial organs further increased 




The first stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs 
is labelled as “ad hoc regulation”. The ambiguity of the law provided 
opportunities to some prosecutorial organs and courts to develop local 
innovation of civil EPIL in response to serious environmental 
violations. With the growing political concerns over environmental 
protection, owing to monetary or non-monetary rewards for legal 
innovation, local prosecutorial organs were also encouraged to file 
civil EPILs.92 Such forces, however, were insufficient to route civil 
EPILs into the mainstream work of prosecutorial organs due to the 
high cost of regulation. In general, procuratorates at local levels were 
reluctant to engage in civil litigations because of the winning rate-
oriented performance appraisal mechanism. Their regulatory 
motivation was also weakened by the lack of regulatory capacity and 
autonomy when engaging in civil litigations against polluters. 93 
Despite sporadic cases in some provinces, local prosecutorial organs 
were unwilling to devote much energy to the practice of civil EPILs. 
 
B. “Forced Regulation”: Experimental Reform from July 2015 
to July 2017 
 
China started to experiment with prosecutor-led EPILs in July 
2015. Since then, the standing of prosecutorial organs to sue in civil 
EPILs has been confirmed and the relevant procedural rules regarding 
civil EPILs have gradually developed. With strong top-down political 
pressure to implement this legal innovation, prosecutorial organs have 
become better equipped and empowered with more autonomy. In the 
second stage, the number of civil EPIL cases grew by 142 percent 
compared with the first stage, from 31 cases up to 75 cases (Figure 5). 
More prosecutorial organs became involved in the practice of civil 
EPILs. However, during the two-year legal experiment, the fully 
loaded political pressure for regulation and concerns over the cost of 
regulation combined to produce an undesirable outcome, that is, 
prosecutorial organs tended to file civil EPILs with less complicated 
facts and concerning less serious instances of environmental pollution. 
 
92 Id. 
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This second stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs is 
termed as “forced regulation”. 
 
1. Certainty of the Law regarding the Standing of Prosecutorial 
Organs 
 
On  July 1, 2015, the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress (“NPCSC”), the national legislature, promulgated 
the Decision on Authorizing the SPP to Launch the Pilot Scheme to 
Initiate PILs in Certain Areas (“Pilot Scheme”) (Table 3). It authorized 
the SPP to experiment with public interest litigations in thirteen 
selected provincial areas (Beijing, Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region, Jilin Province, Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province, Fujian 
Province, Shandong Province, Hubei Province, Guangdong Province, 
Guizhou Province, Yunnan Province, Shannxi Province, and Gansu 
Province) in the area of ecological environment and resource 
protection, preservation of state-owned assets, transfer of state-owned 
land use rights, and food and drug safety.94  
 
The SPP subsequently published two sets of judicial 
interpretations to clarify the procedural rules of public interest 
litigations, including the scope of application, the jurisdiction of the 
procuratorate, the pretrial, the claims as well as the power to protest 
judgments on civil EPIL cases: one was the Plan for the Pilot Scheme 
of Initiating PILs by People’s Procuratorates95 issued on July 2, 2015, 
and the other was the Measures for the Implementation of the Pilot 
Scheme of Initiating PILs by People’s Procuratorates 96  issued on 
December 16, 2015 (Table 3). The SPP designated the Office of Legal 
Supervision of Civil and Administrative Cases to handle public 
interest litigations and increased its staff for the purpose of promoting 
the work of public interest litigations.97 
 
 
94 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, DECISION OF 
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON 
AUTHORIZING THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S PROCURATORATE TO CONDUCT PUBLIC 
INTEREST LITIGATION PILOT PROJECTS (Promulgated on July 2, 2015); Qian Zhang, 
Empirical Analysis on Pilot Project of the Prosecutorial organs’ Institution on 
Public Interest Litigation in China, 5 CHINA LEG. SCI. 32, 39  (2017). 
95 SPP, supra note 5.  
96 See Part IV., infra subsec. B.1. (Table 3).  
97 SPP, MEASURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PILOT SCHEME TO 
INITIATE PILS BY PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES  (Promulgated on Dec. 24, , 2015, 
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At the same time, to deal with public interest litigations brought 
by prosecutorial organs, the SPC issued the Measures for the 
Implementation of the Pilot Program of Trial by People’s Courts of 
Public Interest Litigations Initiated by the People’s Procuratorates98 on 
February 25, 2016 (Table 3). This judicial interpretation stipulates the 
procedural rules of public interest litigations concerning the 
jurisdiction of the court, the documents that prosecutorial organs 
should submit to lodge a case, the announcement period of the 
settlement agreement reached through negotiation or mediation, as 
well as the party’s right to appeal and the procuratorate’s power to 
protest judgements on civil EPIL cases.99 On April 1, 2017, the SPC 
made another judicial interpretation titled the Interim Working Rules 
on the Trials of Environmental Public Interest Litigations.100 It  applies 
to civil EPILs filed by both non-governmental organizations and 
prosecutorial organs (Table 3). The SPC clarified and supplemented 
the procedural rules for prosecutor-led civil EPILs regarding the 
court’s explanations issued to the procuratorate about non-
conformance with the conditions of filing a lawsuit and claims that are 
not well-founded, the presence of the prosecutor in court, the 
exemption of litigation fees and the procuratorate’s right to appeal and 
retrial. 101  Different from the SPP, which argued that prosecutorial 
organs should be distinguished from the plaintiff in civil litigation 
because they serve as legal supervisors of the State,102 the SPC was 
inclined to treat prosecutorial organs as the normal plaintiff, an equal 
party to the defendant in civil EPIL. 
 
In sum, the Pilot Scheme granted prosecutorial organs in the 
13 pilot areas standing to bring civil EPILs from July 2015 to July 
2017, thus eliminating the legal ambiguity regarding the issue of 
standing. In the second stage, the SPP and the SPC also introduced 
much clearer procedural rules for pursuing such litigations. Despite its 
limited application to the selected provincial areas, the law of 
 
98 SPC, THE MEASURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PILOT 
PROGRAM OF TRIAL BY PEOPLE’S COURTS OF PILS INSTITUTED BY PEOPLE’S 
PROCURATORATES (Promulgated on Feb. 25, 2016).  
99 Id. 
100 SPC, INTERIM WORKING RULES OF THE SPC ON THE TRIAL OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION  (Promulgated on Apr. 1, 2017). 
101 Id. art. 40-48. 
102 Hao Li, The Role of Proseutorial Organs in Public Interest Civil 
Litigation (Lun jiancha jiguan zai minshi gongyi susong zhong de diwei), 11 L. SCI. 
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prosecutor-led civil EPILs created much greater certainty than there 
had been in the first stage. 
 
Table 3. Laws and Judicial Interpretations on PILs brought by the 




2. Strong Political Pressure for Regulation 
 
The Pilot Scheme of prosecutor-led PILs firstly became party 
policy during the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central 
Committee in 2014.103 The CPC suggested that the SPP and the SPC 
 
103 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Communique of 
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party 
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should lead a reform to “seek to allow the people’s procuratorates to 
file public interest litigations”.104 The clock was thus set ticking. To 
accomplish this legal reform, several supporting mechanisms were 
adopted. First of all, the SPP and the SPC headed the legal experiment 
and other offices (such as the CPC Central Political and Legal Affairs 
Commission, the Supervisory and Judicial Affairs Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, the Legislative Affairs Commission of 
the NPCSC, and the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council) 
were included in the group.105  Meanwhile, local governments and 
party committees also paid great attention to the experimental reform 
set out in the Pilot Scheme and participated in extensive 
communication and cooperation.106 The party sub-committees within 
the pilot procuratorates were required to enhance the leadership of the 
work of public interest litigations and treat it as a “significant 
assignment”. 107  These organizational arrangements promoted 
information exchange and helped gather collective resources to 
implement the legal reform in the selected local areas. 
 
Second, the performance of the pilot procuratorates was 
closely monitored by the upper-level procuratorates. The SPP often 
called meetings with all pilot procuratorates in order to report on 
progress, exchange information, share experiences, and provide 
guidance for subsequent work. It published on a monthly basis about 
the progress made on initiating public interest litigations and published 
guiding cases. The SPP further established a supervisory group to 
monitor the handling of some significant cases of public interest 
litigation.108 It also initiated a movement called “Filling the Blank” 
(jiejue kongbai 解决空白), requiring every pilot procuratorate to file 
at least one public interest litigation during the second stage. An 
internal report about the work progress of prosecutor-led public 
 
104 Xin Gao, The Making Process of the Work Scheme for Bringing Public 
Interest Litigation by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Zuigaojian gongbu tiqi 
gongyi susong shidian gongzuo fang’an zhiding jingguo), JUSTICE NET (ZHENGYI 
WANG) (July 2, 2015), 
https://www.spp.gov.cn/ztk/2015/gyss/xgzs/201507/t20150702_100620.shtml, see 
also CAPO, supra note 43, at 46–47. 
105 CAPO, supra note 43, at 47. 
106 Jianming Cao, Interim report of the SPP on the Pilot Work of Public 
Interest Litigation Initiated by Prosecutorial Organs, SPP (Nov. 5, 2016), 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/gongbao/2017-02/21/content_2007646.htm. 
107 CAPO, supra note 43, at 55. 
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interest litigations, documented by the SPP, included the following 
statement: 
 
Up to the end of June 2017, all 87 procuratorates at the 
municipal level have initiated public interest litigations; of the 
759 procuratorates at the district level, 736 has filed public 
interest litigations and this accounts for 96.97 percent. Except 
for Beijing City and Jiangsu Province, other prosecutorial 
organs in the pilot areas have all filled the blank.109  
 
Under top-down political pressure for regulation, local 
prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas were forced to emphasize the 
work of PILs and mobilize various resources to carry it out. For 
instance, the provincial prosecutorial organ in a western China pilot 
province required all municipal procuratorates within the province 
to initiate at least one action of public interest litigation before 
March 2016 and the district-level procuratorates to file at least one 
action of public interest litigation before June 2016. Li noted a 
downside to this approach in commenting that the prosecutorial 
organs in these pilot areas “only pursue the result and ignore the 
process”.110 
 
Finally, adopting a carrot-and-stick approach, the SPP and 
provincial procuratorates in the pilot areas provided rewards to 
encourage local innovations that promoted public interest litigations. 
The rewards included propagandizing local innovations as good 
practice and naming the pilot areas coming up with local innovations 
in the SPP and the SPC’s work reports. For instance, positive 
references were made in an official publication of the SPP to the 
establishment of case databases of public interest litigations by the 
procuratorates of Guangdong Province and Gansu Province.111 
 
3. Reduced Cost of Regulation  
 
In the second stage, the number of prosecutors dealing with 
public interest litigations was increased in order to facilitate the legal 
 
109 Report on file with author.  
110 Zheng Li, Exploring the Improvement Path of Prosecutor-led Public 
Interest Litigations: A Perspective of the Pilot Programme's Dilemma (Jiancha 
jiguan tiqi gongyi susong de wanshan lujing tansuo: yi shidian kunjing wei 
shijiao),  244 ACAD. SEARCH TRUTH REAL. (TANQIU) 60, 61 (2017). 






2021]  A PAPER TIGER? PROSECUTORIAL REGULATIONS IN CHINA  363 
 
  
experiment. The SPP approved the addition of 86 municipal-level 
procurators and 761 district-level procurators to implement the Pilot 
Scheme. 112  The prosecutors in charge of public interest litigations 
shared knowledge and experiences with each other.113 Moreover, the 
autonomy of local prosecutorial organs was also improved. In order to 
protect prosecutors from local interference and local protectionism, the 
prosecutorial organs in the pilot areas adopted three measures. First, as 
leaders in the work on public interest litigations, the local party 
committees played a role in restricting interference from the local 
government. For example, the party committee of Yiwu City in 
Zhejiang province made the first guideline in the country that 
supported prosecutors to file public interest litigations. 114  Second, 
some local procuratorates designated the work of public interest 
litigations to the Railroad Transportation Prosecutorial Organ (a 
special people’s procuratorate, Figure 1), which is directly responsible 
to the provincial procuratorate. 115  Third, the SPP established a 
supervisory group and launched several enforcement campaigns on 
land pollution, water protection, forest and grassland protection and 
the like to vertically and directly monitor and control the progress of 
significant cases of public interest litigation.116 
 
Although these measures could, to some extent, help reduce the 
cost of regulation of prosecutorial organs, their impact should not be 
exaggerated. Despite more procurators participating in the work of 
public interest litigations, they had to go through a process of learning 
and gradually accumulating knowledge and experiences of handling 
civil EPILs. It remained difficult for prosecutorial organs to find 
sufficient clues to civil EPIL cases, either from the general public or 
from other government agencies. In terms of financial resources, 
prosecutorial organs still struggled to secure funding that was needed 
 
112 Zhang, supra note 94. 
113 Id. 
114 The Local Party Committee and Government of Yiwu City of Zhejiang 
Province Issued the First Opinions of Supporting Public Interest Litigations 
(Zhejiang yiwu chutai shouge difang dangwei zhengfu zhichi gongyi susong 
yijiang), YIWU GOVERNMENT (Jul. 20, 2017) 
http://www.yw.gov.cn/art/2017/7/20/art_1229138029_50770110.html.  
115 Xi'an Railway Transport Procuratorate Filed the First Civil Public 
Interest Litigation Incidental to Criminal Litigation among Shaanxi Railway 
Prosecutorial Organs, PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATE OF XIAN RAILWAY (Apr. 30, 
2019), 
http://www.sn.jcy.gov.cn/xtxatly/ywgz/gyssjcgz/201904/t20190430_133697.html. 
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to afford litigation expenses (such as expenses incurred collecting 
evidence and hiring experts) even though the SPC had exempted their 
litigation fees for the filing of civil EPILs with the promulgation of the 
Interim Working Rules on the Trials of Environmental Public Interest 
Litigations in April 2017 (Table 3). 
 
Moreover, in terms of regulatory autonomy, even though the 
vertical pressure and empowerment of prosecutorial organs could help 
them mitigate the risk of going against local governments, their 
regulatory motivation and performance remained restricted by the lack 
of regulatory autonomy. One of the interviewees from a northwest 
province provided an example. A prosecutorial organ at the district 
level found that a local large chemical company had illegally emitted 
air pollutants. Although the local EPB made an administrative decision 
to impose a fine of RMB 50,000 and required the company to rectify 
the situation in one month, the company failed to comply with the 
decision and continued to pollute. The local prosecutorial organ 
decided to initiate a civil public interest litigation against the 
company. 117  However, the local government did not allow this to 
happen. The interviewee said: “The prosecutor in charge of this case 
told me that he will resign after finishing the case.” He added that such 
a situation had not just occurred in one case – local prosecutorial 




In the second stage, the case number of prosecutor-led civil 
EPILs greatly increased and more prosecutorial organs participated in 
the practice of civil EPILs. This resulted from the certainty of the law 
regarding the standing of prosecutorial organs and the procedural rules 
regarding civil EPILs as well as the strong political pressure for 
regulation during the legal experiment period. However, given the 
reduced but still high cost of regulation, the pilot prosecutorial organs 
strategically chose to file civil EPILs that had less complicated facts, 
easily accessible evidence, and involved minor environmental 
violations and small and weak defendants compared with the civil 
EPIL cases filed in the first stage. Therefore, in this article the second 
stage of prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs is characterized 
as “forced regulation”. 
 
117 Authors’ Note (To maintain anonymity, we do not cite the source of 










C. “Perfunctory Regulation”: Nationwide Implementation after 
July 2017 
 
After the two-year legal experiment, the prosecutor-led civil 
EPIL was formally written into the Civil Procedure Law in July 2017 
(Table 3). Since then, the nationwide prosecutorial organs have been 
allowed to file civil litigations against environmental polluters. In 2018, 
the number of such litigations grew by 472 cases compared with 75 
cases in the second stage (Figure 5). This mainly resulted from the 
certainty of the law regarding civil EPILs across the country. However, 
this was accompanied by an increased tendency of prosecutorial 
organs to select easier cases, small and weak defendants, and minor 
environmental violations and damage. This is partly because the 
political pressure for regulation imposed on prosecutorial organs has 
become weak while the cost of regulation remains relatively high. This 
third stage of the prosecutor-led civil EPIL practice is termed 
“perfunctory regulation” in this article.  
 
1. Nationwide Certainty of the Law  
 
On June 27, 2017, the NPCSC added the second section of 
Article 55 of the Civil Procedure Law to legalize the practice of 
prosecutor-led civil EPILs.118 The section stipulates as follows:    
   
Where the people’s procuratorate finds in the performance of 
functions any conduct that undermines the protection of the 
ecological environment and resources, infringes upon 
consumers’ lawful rights and interests in the field of food and 
drug safety or any other conduct that damages the public 
interests, it may file a lawsuit with the people’s court if there is 
no State organ or organization prescribed in the preceding 
section or the State organ or organization prescribed in the 
preceding section does not file a lawsuit. If the State organ or 
organization prescribed in the preceding section files a lawsuit, 
the people’s procuratorate may support the filing of the lawsuit. 
 
 
118 Decisions of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress on Amending the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC and the Administrative 
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Subsequently, the SPC and the SPP jointly promulgated the 
Interpretation on Several Issues concerning the Application of Law for 
Public Interest Litigations Initiated by the People’s Procuratorates 
(“Joint Interpretation”) on February 23, 2018.119 Echoing Article 55(2) 
of the Civil Procedure Law, Article 13 of the Joint Interpretation 
provides that prosecutorial organs should make a public announcement 
30 days before bringing an action of EPIL to the courts. As a result, 
the legal ambiguity regarding the standing of prosecutorial organs has 
been eliminated in the country. 
 
2. Weak Political Pressure for Regulation 
 
After the legal experiment was conducted successfully and the 
national law established the standing of prosecutorial organs to sue in 
civil EPILs, the political pressure for regulation through civil EPILs 
was significantly reduced to the extent that it has become weak in the 
third stage. The corresponding mechanisms operating in the second 
stage also faded away and so without vertical supervision and 
monitoring prosecutorial organs are now less incentivized to lodge 
civil EPILs. Moreover, Article 55(2) of the Civil Procedure Law and 
Article 13 of the Joint Interpretation lay down the principle that 
prosecutorial organs should bring an action for civil EPIL only when 
there is no State organ or organization that is eligible to file a civil 
EPIL or the relevant State organ or organization fails to file one. 
Because prosecutor-led civil EPILs are seen as the last resort to protect 
environmental public interests, the overall political pressure for 
regulation through civil EPILs has become much weaker in the third 
stage compared to the previous one.  
 
Recently, the SPP initiated a new scheme titled “Four Major 
Procuratorships” to promote and balance the procuratorate’s work on 
criminal, civil, administrative and public interest litigations.120 This 
indicates that the SPP will play a more active role as the representative 
of public interests and pay more attention to the work of public interest 
litigation than before. However, prosecutor-led public interest 
litigations are not only limited to civil EPILs but also include other 
forms such as prosecutor-led administrative EPILs and public interest 
 
119 SPC & SPP,  INTERPRETATION ON SEVERAL ISSUES CONCERNING THE 
APPLICATION OF LAW FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATIONS INITIATED BY THE 
PEOPLE’S PROCURATORATES (Promulgated on Feb. 23, 2018, Amended on Dec. 29, 
2020).  
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litigations that aim to protect public interests other than environmental 
ones (such as mass consumer interests, state-owned assets, state-
owned land use rights, and cultural heritage). The SPP’s decision to 
strengthen the work of public interest litigation does not guarantee that 
civil EPILs will remain a focal point in the future agenda of 
prosecutorial organs. In other words, prosecutorial organs will still be 
able to fulfil their mission regarding public interest litigation 
designated by the upper-level procuratorates if they shift the focus of 
their work to other forms of public interest litigations. For instance, 
when submitting a report on the work of prosecutor-led public interest 
litigations to the NPCSC in October 2019, the SPP highlighted that the 
total number of recorded public interest litigations in various forms 
reached 214,740 cases, the total number of public interest litigations 
filed in the courts reached 6,353 cases, and the total number of 
recorded EPILs reached 118,012 cases (accounting for 54.96 percent) 
between July 2017 and September 2019.121 But in terms of EPILs filed 
in the courts, the report was silent about whether those cases were 
solved through civil or administrative EPILs. 
 
3. Reducing but Still High Cost of Regulation (and Work-focus 
Shift to Administrative EPIL) 
 
In the third stage, prosecutorial organs under the leadership of 
the SPP have undergone two changes that might help enhance their 
regulatory capacity and reduce their cost of regulation. First, the SPP 
divided the previous Office of Legal Supervision of Civil and 
Administrative Cases at the various levels of the people’s 
procuratorates into three separate offices: the Office of Legal 
Supervision of Civil Cases, the Office of Legal Supervision of 
Administrative Cases and the Office of Public Interest Litigations.122 
The Office of Public Interest Litigations is equipped with independent 
financial and human resources so that prosecutorial organs may obtain 
more capacity for handling public interest litigations efficiently and 
professionally. Second, the SPP required that every provincial area 
 
121 Jun Zhang, Report of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on the 
Procuratorial Work of Public Interest Litigation (Zuigao renmin Jianchayuan 
guanyu kaizhan gongyi susong jiancha gongzuo qingkuang de baogao), SPP (Oct. 
24, 2019), https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tt/201910/t20191024_435925.shtml. 
122 Zhen Li, The Spotlight of The New Divisions of the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate (Zuigaojian quanxin neishe jigou liangxiang), PEOPLE’S DAILY 
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should have at least one environmental authentication institution that 
is willing to provide expert opinions without advance payment of 
authentication expenses. Therefore, prosecutorial organs are able to 
save on the expense of hiring experts until a judicial decision is made 
by a court, and the defendant will be ordered to pay authentication fees 
if it loses the case.123 This can somewhat reduce the financial cost for 
prosecutorial organs in filing civil EPILs. 
 
However, the roles of the above innovations in reducing the 
cost of regulation of prosecutorial organs are limited. Their lack of 
knowledge and experiences of dealing with civil litigation cannot be 
solved merely through setting up a separate office in charge of public 
interest litigations. The high cost of regulation associated with the 
success rate of litigation remains a big concern of prosecutorial organs 
when calculating the cost of regulation through civil EPILs because 
the same performance appraisal mechanism still operates within the 
procuratorate system in the third stage. Despite the second innovation 
mentioned above, prosecutorial organs still need to bear authentication 
expenses if they lose lawsuits. Such a practice will still cause them 
very much care about the success rate of civil EPILs and become 
cautious in case selection. In terms of the regulatory autonomy of 
prosecutorial organs, their lack of resistance to local interference 
remains unchanged since the local governments and party committees 
withdrew their special support for the purpose of implementing party 
policy and facilitating the legal experiment during the second stage. 
 
Moreover, in the third stage, prosecutorial organs have 
demonstrated a clear shift of their work focus from civil to 
administrative EPILs. Together with the legal experiment on civil 
EPILs, the legal experiment on administrative EPILs was also 
conducted in the second stage.124 According to Article 25(4) of the 
Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
amended on June 27, 2017,125 when a prosecutorial organ finds that an 
administrative organ with the duties of supervision and administration 
in the field of environment and resource protection fails to perform its 
duties and causes damage to the national interest or social and public 
interests, the prosecutorial organ has the power to issue a “letter of 
 
123 Ministry of Justice, NOTICE OF THE GENERAL OFFICE OF THE MINISTRY 
OF JUSTICE ON FURTHER IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
DAMAGE FORENSIC APPRAISAL (Promulgated on May 24, 2019). 
124 SPP, supra note 5. 






2021]  A PAPER TIGER? PROSECUTORIAL REGULATIONS IN CHINA  369 
 
  
prosecutorial suggestions” (jiancha jianyishu 检察建议书) to that 
administrative organ and put pressure on the latter to perform its duties 
pursuant to the law. The administrative organ should follow the 
prosecutorial suggestions and reply in written form to the prosecutorial 
organ within two months of receiving the suggestions. If there is an 
emergent risk of incurring further damage, it should reply in written 
form within 15 days.126 The case will be closed in the pre-proceeding 
stage if the administrative organ complies with the prosecutorial 
suggestions. Otherwise, the prosecutorial organ has the power to file 
an administrative litigation against the administrative organ.127 
 
The parties to administrative EPILs are prosecutorial organs on 
the one hand and the delinquent administrative organ on the other. 
Filing administrative EPILs is indeed part of the procuratorate’s work 
of legal supervision over administrative agencies to ensure that their 
activities conform to the law. Administrative EPILs focus on the legal 
supervision of administrative organs which fail to discharge their 
duties over environmental and resource protection. The finding in this 
article is that prosecutorial organs have been more active in engaging 
in administrative EPILs than in civil ones, demonstrating an obvious 
shift in the work focus of prosecutorial organs in the third stage.  
 
Table 4 presents a comparison between the civil EPIL work 
and the administrative EPIL work of prosecutorial organs during the 
second stage and during the first four months of 2019 – this was used 
as a sample for the third stage due to the availability of data. It shows 
that prosecutorial organs generally prefer administrative to civil public 
interest litigations. In terms of the number of cases on file, 
administrative EPILs accounted for 93.68 percent from January to 
April 2019, much higher than that of civil EPILs (6.32 percent) during 
the same period. Although the regulatory capacity of prosecutorial 
organs has been enhanced in the third stage, most of the organizational 
resources are spent on administrative EPIL work, leading to civil EPIL 
work being marginalized or rendered a “decoration” (peichen 陪衬).128 
Moreover, although prosecutorial organs are devoted to administrative 
 
126 SPC & SPP, supra note 119. 
127 Id. 
128 Xiaobin Weng & Xiang Zhou, A Study on the Phenomenon of “Taking 
Administrative Litigationss as Primary, the Civil Litigations as Supplement” in the 
Pilot Areas of Public Interest Litigations (Gongyi susong shidian zhong de 
“xingzhu minfu” xianxiang yanjiu), 11 SOC. SCI. FRONT (SHEHUI KEXUE 
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EPIL work, they have actually filed a much smaller percentage of 
administrative EPILs at the courts in the third stage (9.48 percent) than 
the second stage (21.65 percent). This means that most administrative 
EPILs are solved in the pre-trial stage and litigation is not common. 
 





Source: SPP’s work report on the prosecutor-led PIL in the pilot areas (June 2017); 
SPP’s work report on the national prosecutor-led PIL (January - February 2019), and 
SPP’s work report on the national prosecutor-led PIL (March -April 2019). We could 
not find the work report in 2018. These report files are with the authors.  
 
The work-focus shift of prosecutorial organs to pre-trial 
resolution of administrative EPILs resulted from an institutional 
calculation of the cost of regulation in terms of the availability of clues 
to cases, difficulties of handling cases, and other organizational 
benefits concerned. 129  In other words, administrative EPIL work 
requires a lower cost of regulation than civil EPIL but is likely to 
generate effects of regulation more valued by the SPP. Specifically, 
first, prosecutorial organs can more easily obtain and access clues to 
administrative EPILs than those of civil EPILs.130 As Table 4 shows, 
81.90 percent of clues to cases were administrative, and only 18.10 
percent were civil in the second stage. In the first four months of 2019, 
the percentage of clues to administrative case increased by 12.35 
percent and reached 94.25 percent while that of clues to civil case 
 
129 Id. at 219-221. 
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decreased to 5.75 percent. As the state organ of legal supervision, 
prosecutorial organs have much experience supervising and 
monitoring administrative agencies. The easy accessibility of clues to 
administrative cases therefore helps to save on the cost of regulation 
in the practice of EPILs. 
 
Second, prosecutorial organs have fewer difficulties in 
handling administrative EPILs than in handing civil EPILs. The key 
legal issue for prosecutorial organs to prove in administrative EPILs is 
a dereliction of duty on the part of the administrative agency,131 and it 
is not so difficult for prosecutorial organs to obtain the relevant 
evidence given their rich experiences concerning legal supervision of 
administrative organs. In civil EPILs, however, prosecutorial organs 
have to deal with much more complicated facts, legal issues as well as 
claims, and spend more financial and human resources collecting 
evidence regarding the issues of unlawfulness, fault, causation and 
damages.132  
 
Third, prosecutorial organs may obtain their organizational 
benefits through administrative EPILs. As Table 4 shows, most 
administrative EPIL cases are closed before litigation as the 
Administrative Procedure Law allows prosecutorial organs to issue a 
letter of prosecutorial suggestions as a precondition for filing 
administrative public interest litigation, and thus have a chance to 
negotiate with the targeted administrative organs. A prosecutor from 
Shaanxi Province told us in our interview that: 
 
Prosecutorial organs focus more on administrative EPILs 
because the handling of administrative cases is less costly. 
Prosecutorial organs are encouraged to close the cases in the 
pre-trial stage. During the legal experiment, local 
administrative institutions were on their guard for the possible 
risks of being sued by prosecutorial organs. After the legal 
experiment, they knew what would happen and came up with 
a routinized mechanism with the local prosecutorial organs. 




131 Id. at 220. 
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This statement echoes that of another prosecutor from Guangdong 
Province that we interviewed: 
 
During 2015 and 2017, Guangdong Province, among the first 
batch of pilot areas, brought a number of administrative public 
interest litigations. Now we become more rational because our 
ultimate goal is not suing an administrative organ. Instead, we 
want to solve environmental problems. The current practice is 
to issue a letter of prosecutorial suggestions. If administrative 
organs reply and correct their misconducts, prosecutorial 
organs will not sue them … Now we deal with such cases 
through pre-trial resolution … 
 
Indeed, due to a lack of autonomy, local prosecutorial organs 
bring lawsuits against local governments with great caution. At the 
same time, local procuratorates are also motivated to make use of their 
authority of legal supervision over administrative organs as a 
bargaining chip so that they can mobilize more political and 
organizational resources. Such a motivation has become much 
stronger after the anti-corruption office was removed from the 
prosecutorial system, which lost political advantages in trading with 
local governments. The administrative public interest litigation system 
provides such an opportunity. As a prosecutor from Fujian Province 
told us: “we want to enhance our supervisory power through 
administrative public interest litigations to impose more pressure on 
the local government.” In their article, Weng and Zhou also advance a 
similar view: 
 
The establishment of the National Supervisory Commission 
has greatly weakened the prosecutorial power. After removing 
the centralized power of investigating corruption cases, the 
prosecutorial organs are badly in need of a new authority to fill 
this vacuum. Therefore, some local procuratorates have 
suggested changing from playing ‘anti-corruption card’ to 
playing ‘legal supervision card.’ Obviously, to be the plaintiffs 
of public interest litigation is a chance … prosecutorial organs 
















In the third stage, prosecutorial organs nationwide have been 
given the standing to sue in civil EPILs and the legal ambiguity has 
been completely removed. Prosecutorial regulation through civil 
EPILs has instead become part of the procuratorate’s responsibilities 
and its routine work. Prosecutorial organs have to file civil EPILs 
against polluters in order to discharge their responsibility in this regard. 
According to an official report, Chinese environmental protection 
bureaus imposed administrative sanctions on 186,000 cases in 2018, 
while the number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs nationwide was 
1,021, 134  accounting for 0.55 percent of the administrative 
sanctions.135  Therefore, only a small fraction of the environmental 
pollution cases escalated to civil EPILs are being brought by 
prosecutorial organs. On the other hand, with the weak political 
pressure for regulation and the continued high cost of regulation, 
prosecutorial organs are inclined to choose less complicated cases 
involving minor environmental pollution, weak and small defendants, 
and a small amount of monetary claims. Moreover, in the third stage, 
prosecutorial organs have devoted most of their efforts to 
administrative EPILs because of the lower cost of regulation in 
engaging in such administrative cases, which further weakens the 
regulatory motivation of prosecutorial organs to pursue civil EPILs. 
Despite the enhanced financial and human resources, prosecutorial 
organs have tended to use them to deal with administrative but not civil 
EPIL work. For this reason, the third stage of prosecutorial regulation 




This article classifies the regulatory practices of the Chinese 
prosecutorial organs in terms of lodging civil environmental public 
interest litigations against polluters from 2003 to 2018 into three stages: 
local innovation before July 2015, legal experiment from July 2015 to 
July 2017, and nationwide establishment of the prosecutor-led civil 
EPIL system after July 2017. The empirical findings show that the 
overall number of prosecutor-led civil EPILs has grown throughout the 
 
134 SPP, supra note 47. 
135 Ganjie Li, The Report of the State Council on Environmental Situation 
and Accomplishment of Environmental Protection Goals in 2018, Ministry of 
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three stages, whereas the percentage of cases with complicated facts, 
strong corporate polluters, severe environmental violations, and high 
damage amounts has decreased in turn. In other words, prosecutorial 
organs have been filing more and more civil EPIL cases, but they have 
a strong preference for cases with less complicated facts, weak and 
small defendants, minor environmental violations, and small amounts 
of monetary damage. Therefore, although the Chinese prosecutorial 
regulators are more than a paper tiger, they are also far from being a 
tiger with sharp teeth.  
 
To further explain the changes in prosecutorial regulation 
through civil EPILs in China, the article examined the regulatory 
motivation of prosecutorial organs over the three stages, investigating 
the dynamics of three factors that influence regulatory motivation: 
ambiguity of the law (legal factor), top-down political pressure for 
regulation (political factor), and organizational cost of regulation 
(organizational factor). The three stages of the regulatory practice of 
prosecutorial organs present three models resulting from the dynamic 
combination of the legal, political and organizational factors. Without 
the political pressure for regulation and the certainty of the law, and 
with the high cost of regulation, the prosecutorial organs only engaged 
in environmental regulation sporadically. This was the “ad hoc 
regulation” of the first stage. Under an authoritarian political regime, 
the top-down political pressure for regulation forced prosecutorial 
organs in the pilot areas to file civil EPILs against environmental 
polluters despite the continued high cost of regulation. This was the 
“forced regulation” of the second stage. When top-down political 
pressure for regulation becomes weak, prosecutorial organs retreat and 
carry out the civil EPIL work without real determination. This is the 
“perfunctory regulation” of the third stage (Table 5). 
 
This study finds that the legal ambiguity provided 
opportunities for local innovation of civil EPILs. The law that clearly 
establishes the standing and procedures for prosecutorial regulators is 
a necessary but not sufficient condition for the development of 
prosecutorial regulation through civil EPILs. The organizational cost 
of regulation, which is concerned with the risk of losing litigation, the 
cost of litigation and the risk of going against local government, has 
the most bite. The cost of regulation has become a common factor that 
significantly influences the regulatory motivation of prosecutorial 
organs and shapes their regulatory behaviours in filing civil EPILs 
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prosecutorial organs prefer civil litigations incidental to criminal 
litigation, and prefer to file cases with less complicated facts, weak and 
small defendants, and minor environmental violations. They also 
prefer the administrative EPIL work (in particular, pre-trial resolution 
of administrative EPILs) rather than the civil EPIL work. 
 




This study argues that a short-run top-down approach has very 
limited effectiveness, which seems a common problem of regulation 
in China. It also provides evidence that the perceived cost of regulation 
by regulators is the Achilles’ heel of regulation in authoritarian China. 
To address notoriously weak environmental law enforcement at the 
local level, the central authority often sets “high-priority, quantitative 
environmental targets” to mobilize its massive bureaucracy.136 The 
outcome, however, is often poor because of weak regulatory capacity 
and lack of autonomy and accountability.137 This state of affairs is 
reflected in the well-known idiom that “the central has measures, and 
the local has counter-measures (shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice 上有
政策,下有对策)”.138 Similar problems have occurred in food safety 
regulation. The widely used top-down regulatory campaigns, 
according to Liu, “reflects Beijing’s institutional weakness in 
stabilizing its regulatory capacity”.139 In fact, the top-down approach 
takes no account of the perceived cost of regulation by regulators 
 
136 Wang, supra note 1. 
137 Id.; Kostka, supra note 2. 
138 Wang, supra note 1, at 416. 
139 Peng Liu, Tracing and Periodizing China’s Food Safety Regulation: A 
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associated with the organizational appraisal system, regulatory 
capacity and regulatory autonomy.     
 
This study also highlights the conditions needed for successful 
prosecutorial regulation: low cost of regulation and a well-developed 
legal system. In Brazil, although the Ministério Público (the Public 
Prosecution Office, “MP”) had originally been dedicated primarily to 
criminal prosecution, civil litigation on behalf of environmental 
interests became “an equally important part of its work”.140 Based on 
the existing studies, the success of prosecutorial enforcement in Brazil 
mainly resulted from two conditions. First, the Brazilian Constitution 
of 1988 grants the MP strong “administrative and functional 
autonomy”,141 including high independence from other branches of the 
government and the other three judicial branches, budget guarantees 
and autonomy, and strong personal tenure for prosecutors.142  This 
allows them to act free of undue influence from local government. In 
addition, “e[E]ach prosecutor independently chooses how to conduct 
the investigations and lawsuits in his or her jurisdiction without fear of 
dismissal, demotion, or involuntary transfer to another jurisdiction”.143 
All these reforms were taking place when Brazil began to transform 
into a democracy after a military dictatorship, and thus leaders of the 
MP had the opportunity to lobby for the institution’s independence and 
civil litigation powers.144 Second, the MP went through a process of 
capacity building in terms of recruitment and specialization. The 
mindset of prosecutors was also changed and they began to perceive 
“the institution’s civil work to be more dynamic and important than its 
criminal work”.145 As a result, the number of public civil actions filed 
each year by the MP rose to almost 10 percent of the number of 
administrative fines issued each year throughout the 1990s, 146 
compared with only 0.55 percent in China.147 
 
 
140 Lesley K. McAllister, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 57 (2008). 
141 Id. at 64. 
142 Shi& van Rooij, supra note 4; McAllister, supra note 140, at 64–65. 
143 McAllister, supra note 140, at 65. 
144 Id. at 75, 83. 
145 Id. at 82. 
146 Id. at 101. 
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Despite some criticisms of excessive discretion and limited 
accountability,148 the Brazilian experience shows that autonomy and 
capacity are critical to effective prosecutorial environmental 
regulation. China’s experiences have confirmed this. In particular, the 
lack of regulatory autonomy on the part of the Chinese prosecutorial 
organs has significantly increased the costs of regulation and thus 
undermined the effectiveness of prosecutorial regulation in the 
environmental regulatory landscape. Moreover, associated with the 
limited regulatory capacity, the existing winning rate-oriented 
performance appraisal mechanism further discourages prosecutorial 
organs from filing important but controversial civil EPIL cases. These 
factors have combined to frustrate the establishment of a culture and 
practice of active and effective prosecutorial regulation that safeguards 
environmental interests. As Mueller found from Brazil’s prosecutorial 
enforcement, “when the costs to the regulator are high, the equilibrium 
level of compliance will be low”, and “these costs can include not only 
the administrative and logistic cost but also the political costs of 
contradicting the interests of those in power or those it relies on for 
support”.149 
 
McAllister argues that prosecutors in “civil law countries 
tended to play a larger role in protecting the public interests in private 
civil litigation than the attorney general in common law countries”.150 
In order to promote prosecutorial regulation in China, the autonomy of 
prosecutorial organs must be enhanced. The government should 
further implement institutional reform within the procuratorate system 
with the aim of centralizing the management of personnel, financial 
and material resources of local procuratorates below the provincial 
level.151 Capacity building, of course, is an equally significant means 
of improving prosecutorial regulation. The SPP needs to reform the 
current winning rate-oriented performance appraisal criteria in order 
to motivate prosecutorial regulation through public interest litigations. 
 
148 Salo V. Coslovsky, Relational Regulation in the Brazilian Ministério 
Publico: The organizational basis of regulatory responsiveness, 5 REG. 
GOVERNANCE 70, 71 (2011). 
149 Bernardo Mueller, Who Enforces Enforcement?: Can Public 
Prosecutors in Brazil Break the Endless Regress?, 3RD WORLD CONG. OF ENVTL. 
& RES. ECONOMISTS, KYOTO, JAPAN 1–25, 23 (2006), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.381.7076. 
150 McAllister, supra note 140, at 61; see also John Henry Merryman & 
Rogelio Perez-Perdomo, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA. 103 (4th ed. 1985). 
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In addition, despite the established standing and procedures for 
prosecutor-led EPILs, the proper rules regarding environmental 
damage authentication, cooperation with EPBs with respect to case 
information and evidence collection and effective judgment 
enforcement, the management and supervision of the use of awarded 
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